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I. INTRODUCTION 
Due to its open nature, the Cuban economy has always depended 
considerably on the performance of its external sector, especially on 
activities involving foreign trade. With export activities no longer 
dominated by sales of primary goods, today’s Cuban economy is to a 
large degree a service-based economy in which international tourism and 
exports of professional services (along with remittances from abroad) 
have replaced the once-thriving sugar industry as the country’s primary 
sources of hard currency. Services currently account for about 80% of 
Cuba’s gross domestic product (GDP), generate the vast majority of 
foreign exchange revenues, and receive the largest share of all 
investments. A notable expansion of exports of healthcare services to 
Venezuela in recent years actually has produced surpluses in the island’s 
overall trade balance. Yet Cuba remains chronically short of hard 
currency.  
In addition to the Cuban economy’s serious structural shortcomings 
that adversely impact trade operations, Cuba’s external sector suffers 
from a number of critical weaknesses, associated above all with the 
failure to diversify production and markets for export, a particular 
sensitivity to international price swings, and insufficient cross-sectorial 
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spillovers. Furthermore, although the value of imports of goods and 
services as a share of GDP at market prices is today about half of its level 
in 1990, Cuba’s dependence on purchases of oil, food products, and other 
key goods from abroad is still quite high. A huge merchandise trade 
deficit generates substantial negative effects on the current account of 
Cuba’s balance of payments (BOP) and complicates the country’s efforts 
to meet its financial obligations to foreign traders, lenders, and investors.  
In all fairness, Cuba faces major constraints in its ability to access 
external financing to address BOP problems, to carry out investment in 
national productive capacities, and to cover emergency needs. Albeit 
mitigated by official support from Venezuela and a few other partners, 
these constraints are only partially due to Cuba’s history of unmet 
payments and its large (yet recently reduced) external debt. The island 
nation remains under a far-reaching U.S. embargo and is excluded from 
most international lending organizations that could provide financial 
relief. The economic sanctions imposed by Washington also hamper the 
dealings of international banks with Havana’s government and the 
business operations of foreign investors in the Cuban market. But the 
U.S.-Cuba rapprochement that began toward the end of 2014 under the 
Obama administration has led to a relaxation of embargo rules and 
strengthened economic ties between the two countries at a time when 
Cuba is in the midst of significant economic reforms and actively 
courting foreign investment to revive its struggling economy, whose 
woes are being amplified by a profound crisis in Venezuela. The 
rapprochement, nonetheless, was partially rolled back in mid-2017 when 
President Donald Trump announced tighter restrictions on U.S. travel to 
and business dealings with Cuba. 
This study analyzes the current conditions (with a brief review of 
macroeconomic trends since 1990) in Cuba’s external sector and 
identifies key problems that pose major challenges for the future. It 
examines Cuba’s merchandise and service trade patterns, its largest 
sources of hard currency, its external debt and overall financial situation, 
and its latest attempts to attract overseas investors following the 
enactment of a new foreign investment law and the opening of a special 
development zone at the port of Mariel. The study also analyzes the 
economic effects of Obama’s measures on Cuba and offers some 
preliminary considerations on the potential impact of Trump’s more 
restrictive policy toward the island.  
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II. TRENDS AND CONDITIONS 
The Cuban economy has recovered markedly from the devastating 
meltdown of the early 1990s after its former benefactor, the Soviet Union, 
collapsed. During the deep recession that started in 1990 and reached its 
lowest point in 1993, Cuba’s real GDP shrank by an annual average rate 
of approximately 10%.1 Since then, economic growth has been positive 
even though the rate has fluctuated considerably from year to year, and 
the island’s economy witnessed a remarkable expansion around the mid-
2000s. As shown in Figure 1, Cuba reported a GDP growth of 11.2% in 
2005, 12.1% in 2006, and 7.3% in 2007. This performance was fueled by 
the dynamism of internal demand, due to increased public investment, 
government spending, and private consumption, and above all by 
growing exports of goods and services. Thriving exports of medical and 
other professional services under a comprehensive agreement with the 
government of Venezuela (involving sizable supplies of Venezuelan oil 
to Havana) and, to a smaller degree, substantial revenues from nickel 
exports and international tourism were key stimulating factors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 1.  OFICINA NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA E INFORMACIÓN, ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO DE CUBA 
1994 (1996) [hereinafter ONEI 1996]. 
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Figure 1. Cuba’s Real GDP Growth, 20042016 
(at constant 1997 prices)2 
 
 
 
After 2008, however, the Cuban economy suffered a notable 
deceleration caused by both internal and external factors. The critical 
factor on the internal front was the slow rate of progress with productivity 
and efficiency, largely caused by the systemic constraints of Cuba’s state-
dominated and highly centralized economy. On the external front, the 
negative effects of the global financial and economic crisis that erupted 
with full force toward the end of 2008 came on top of damaging natural 
disasters and the cumulative effects of the long-standing U.S. embargo 
against Cuba.3 Cuba’s annual GDP growth averaged 2.5% in 20092013, 
                                                                                                                     
 2.  OFICINA NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA E INFORMACIÓN, PANORAMA ECONÓMICO Y SOCIAL 
CUBA 2016 (2017) http://www.one.cu/publicaciones/08informacion/panorama2016/ 
Panorama2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DU7-SN95] [hereinafter ONEI 2017]; OFICINA NACIONAL 
DE ESTADÍSTICA E INFORMACIÓN, ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO DE CUBA 2015 (2016), 
http://www.one.cu/aec2015/00%20Anuario%20Estadistico%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QE 
W-99H2] [hereinafter ONEI 2016]; OFICINA NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA E INFORMACIÓN, 
ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO DE CUBA 2014 (2015) http://www.one.cu/aec2014/00AnuarioEstadistico 
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/73KY-2ZWB] [hereinafter ONEI 2015]; OFICINA NACIONAL DE 
ESTADÍSTICA E INFORMACIÓN, ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO DE CUBA 2008 (2009), 
http://www.one.cu/aec2008.htm [https://web.archive.org/web/20090919210959/; http://www. 
one.cu/aec2008.htm] [hereinafter ONEI 2009].  
 3.  For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the global crisis of 2007–2008 on the 
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dropped to just 1% in 2014, and rebounded to little more than 4% in 2015 
only because, as Havana’s authorities admitted, the country was able to 
secure cash advances and timely credit and benefited from a fall in the 
prices of some of its imports.4 In 2016, however, Cuba’s GDP shrank 
0.9% as lower export revenues, other cash restrictions, and reduced 
supplies of Venezuelan oil led to the first annual contraction of the 
island’s economy in more than two decades.5  
During the 1990s, the Cuban economy also experienced a crucial 
transformation from an economy centered on agriculture, and especially 
sugar production, to one based on services such as international tourism. 
It witnessed yet another new dramatic change in the post-2004 period 
principally as a result of Venezuela’s financial largesse and its booming 
ties with Cuba.6 Exports of professional services mainly offered by 
Cuban physicians and nurses in Venezuela quickly became (and still are) 
the top generator of hard currency for Cuba, even though in recent years 
the island has begun to provide for-profit medical services to a number 
of countries, among them Brazil and oil-rich nations in Africa and the 
Middle East.7 As for exports of goods, whereas in 1990 they represented 
over 90% of Cuba’s total exports, by 2015 they accounted for less than 
25%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
Cuban economy, see Carmelo Mesa-Lago & Pavel Vidal Alejandro, The Impact of the Global 
Crisis on Cuba’s Economy and Social Welfare, 42 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 689 (2010). 
 4.  Leticia Martínez Hernández, Economía Cubana Creció un 4%, GRANMA (Dec. 20, 
2015, 7:12 PM), http://www.granma.cu/cuba/2015-12-20/economia-cubana-crecio-un-4-20-12-
2015-19-12-34 [https://perma.cc/W9D8-KPFM]. Forecasts for 2016–2017 are much worse. 
 5.  Sarah Marsh & Marc Frank, Cuba Says Economy Shrank this Year in Tandem with 
Venezuela Crisis, REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2016, 12:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-
economy-idUSKBN14G1E0 [https://perma.cc/FA67-AN95]. 
 6.  Jorge Mario Sánchez Egozcue & Juan Triana Cordoví, Un Panorama Actual de la 
Economía Cubana, Las Transformaciones en Curso y sus Retos Perspectivos (Real Instituto 
Elcano, Working Paper No. 31/2008, 2008). 
 7.  Ricardo Torres Pérez, Exportaciones y Desarrollo Económico en Cuba: Entre 
Reformas y el 17D, in CUBA EN UN NUEVO ESCENARIO: PERSPECTIVAS DE DESARROLLO 
ECONÓMICO 168 (Ricardo Torres Pérez et al. eds., 2015).  
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Table 1. Exports of Goods and Services by Sector in 1990, 2004, and 
2015 (percentage distribution)8  
 
1990 % 2004 % 2015 % 
Sugar  
72.6 
Tourism 37.5 Other services 58.7 
Nickel  6.7 Other services 21.0 Tourism 18.9 
Tobacco  1.9 Nickel 19.0 Nickel 3.5 
Pharmaceuticals  1.4 Sugar 4.8 Sugar 2.9 
Other goods  8.6 Tobacco 3.8 Pharmaceuticals 2.7 
Tourism  4.1 Pharmaceuticals 2.9 Tobacco 1.4 
Other services  4.7 Other goods 11.0 Other goods 11.9 
 
 
Table 1 highlights the aforementioned changes by presenting annual data 
on the sectorial composition of Cuban exports (percentage distribution in 
terms of earnings) between 1990 and 2015. In 1990, when the Soviet 
Union was about to disintegrate, Cuba’s sugar industry brought in over 
$4 billion of exports representing 72.6% of the island’s total hard 
currency revenues. Nickel exports and an incipient tourism industry also 
made a modest contribution.9 While sugar fell on hard times during the 
1990s, gross revenues from international tourism grew noticeably and by 
1996 had surpassed those from sugar exports. Overseas sales of nickel 
also expanded during this period. By the early 2000s, nickel had become 
the leading foreign exchange earner among Cuban goods.10 In 2004, right 
before Cuba stepped up the deployment of medical personnel and other 
professionals abroad, gross revenues from tourism activities represented 
37.5% of Cuba’s total exports of goods and services. That year, nickel 
exports accounted for 19% of total earnings while the share of sugar, the 
mainstay of the Cuban economy for most of its history, was less than 5%. 
The share of tobacco, another traditional export sector, did not reach 
4%.11 
But since then, almost everything has changed due to the Venezuelan 
factor. Mostly driven by Cuba’s special deals with Venezuela in the area 
                                                                                                                     
 8.  ONEI 2016, supra note 2; OFICINA NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA E INFORMACIÓN, 
ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO DE CUBA 2004 (2005), http://www.one.cu/aec2004.htm [https://web. 
archive.org/web/20060704131722/; http://www.one.cu:80/aec2004.htm] [hereinafter ONEI 
2005]; ONEI 1996, supra note 1. 
 9.  ONEI 1996, supra note 1. 
 10.  Jorge F. Pérez-López, Cuba’s External Sector and the VI Party Congress, CUBA IN 
TRANSITION, Aug. 2011, at 439, http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v21-
perezlopez.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB4M-9RW3]. 
 11.  ONEI 2005, supra note 8.  
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of medical assistance, the percentage of Cuba’s total exports of goods and 
services accounted for by services other than tourism almost tripled 
between 2004 and 2015, from 21.0% to 58.7%. Meanwhile, revenues 
from international tourism dropped to 18.9% of the total, around half its 
level from 2004. The relative contribution of nearly every other sector of 
the Cuban economy underwent a similar downward trend. In 2015, nickel 
exports generated 3.5% of Cuba’s foreign exchange income from all trade 
activities and sugar exports accounted for just 2.9%. International sales 
of tobacco products (mainly cigars) provided only 1.4% of all hard 
currency earnings.12 Although Cuba’s revenues from the sale of 
professional services to Venezuela and the latter’s oil shipments to 
Havana have declined since late 2014 due to Venezuela’s economic crisis 
amid falling oil prices,13 the economic lifeline that Venezuela has thrown 
to Cuba for over a decade is beyond question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 12.  ONEI 2016, supra note 2. 
 13.  Rigoberto Diaz, Cuba Drills for Own Oil as Venezuelan Flow Falters, AFP (June 8, 
2017, 10:20 AM), http://www.france24.com/en/20170608-cuba-drills-own-oil-venezuelan-flow-
falters [https://perma.cc/PAY7-GP5X]; Franz von Bergen, Venezuela Cuts Oil Shipments to Cuba 
Forcing Castro to Consider Veering to U.S., FOX NEWS LATINO (July 27, 2016), 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/07/27/venezuela-cuts-oils-shipments-to-cuba-forcing-
castros-to-consider-veer-to-us.html [https://perma.cc/UDN6-NK72]; Antonio María Delgado, 
Venezuela Slashes Oil Shipments to Cuba, Caribbean in Half, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 26, 2015, 
6:10 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article 
16381898.html [https://perma.cc/CMB6-4L5J]. 
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Figure 2. Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, 2004-201514 
 
 
 
 
Cuba’s annual trade balance in goods and services consistently ran 
deficits between 1990 and 2004. Cuba remained a net importer of 
resources from abroad during this period as rapidly expanding tourism 
revenues failed to offset a mounting merchandise trade deficit. It was only 
after 2004, when exports of professional services skyrocketed, that the 
overall trade balance began to post surpluses, albeit not every year 
(Figure 2). Exports of goods and services jumped from $5.6 billion in 
2004 to $17.8 billion in 2014 (when a surplus of $4 billion was achieved) 
and stood at about $14.9 billion in 2015. Cuba does not publish 
disaggregated statistics on the service trade, with the exception of tourism 
activities. In 2015, non-tourism services generated approximately $8.8 
billion in hard currency revenues; albeit on a declining trend, as much as 
$7.5 billion may have come from the sale of professional services 
abroad.15 
A hefty increase of exports of professional services in the post-2004 
                                                                                                                     
 14.  ONEI 2016, supra note 2; ONEI 2009, supra note 2. 
 15.  The values of Cuba’s exports of services other than tourism practically refer to 
revenues from exports of various professional services and, to a lower extent, telecommunications 
given that official data on gross tourism earnings already include earnings from international 
transportation services. 
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period also led to an improved position in Cuba’s BOP. The three 
principal components of a country’s BOP are the current account, the 
capital account, and the financial account. The current account records 
the net flow of money arising from trade of goods and services, factor 
income like dividends paid to foreign investors, and other cash transfers 
such as remittances and donations. The capital and financial accounts 
gauge the net change in foreign assets, including foreign investment, 
loans, and reserves. In essence, the first component determines the 
international exposure of an economy while the other two components 
explain how it is financed. In the second half of the 1990s and early 
2000s, tourism incomes partially mitigated the deficit in the current 
account of Cuba’s BOP, as did remittance inflows whose estimated 
amount at that time ranged between $500 million and $1.1 billion per 
year.16 Since then, except in 2006 and 2008, the current account has 
recorded surpluses or remained practically balanced. Cuba, however, 
does not provide information on the capital account and the scanty 
official statistics on the financial account have not been updated since 
2001, making it difficult to measure the island’s access to foreign 
financing. 
Despite this lack of solid data, Cuba’s chronic cash shortages and its 
repeated failures to respect its debt payments are well known. In 
particular, the government-backed credits Cuba receives from China and 
other strategic partners and a significant portion of its revenues from the 
export of professional services to Venezuela are funds committed to the 
purchase of products from these countries. The Cuban government must 
rely primarily on exports of nickel and a few other products, international 
tourism, and overseas remittances to build foreign exchange liquidity and 
reserves. Cuba had a difficult period in 2008-2009 during which 
Havana’s authorities delayed payments to foreign creditors and froze 
hundreds of millions of dollars in the Cuban bank accounts of many 
foreign suppliers and partners in joint ventures,17 until Cuba’s liquidity 
                                                                                                                     
 16.  PAOLO SPADONI, FAILED SANCTIONS: WHY THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA COULD 
NEVER WORK 148 (2010) [hereinafter SPADONI, FAILED SANCTIONS]; Manuel Orozco, On 
Remittances, Markets and the Law: The Cuban Experience in Present Times, CUBA IN 
TRANSITION, Aug. 2009, at 406, http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v19-
orozco.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWE7-UGQF]; Lorena Barberia, Remittances to Cuba: An 
Evaluation of Cuban and U.S. Government Policy Measures, in THE CUBAN ECONOMY AT THE 
START OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 353, 368 (2004). 
 17.  Marc Frank, Global Crisis, Storms Hit Cuba Finances, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2008, 10:48 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/cuba-economy-idUSN1244996520081217 [https:// 
perma.cc/M64R-5QDX]; Gerardo Arreola, Cuba Tiene Congeladas Desde Hace 6 Meses las 
Cuentas Bancarias de Empresas Extranjeras, LA JORNADA (May 24, 2009), 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2009/05/25/index.php?section=mundo&article=033n1mun 
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problems began to improve thanks above all to record numbers of 
international arrivals and associated revenues and a spike in remittances 
from abroad (mainly sent by Cuban Americans).18 Annual gross earnings 
from tourism activities rose from $2.1 billion in 2009 to $2.8 billion in 
2015.19 Remittances, according to unofficial sources, more than doubled 
during this period to more than $3 billion per year and possibly emerged 
as Cuba’s second largest source of hard currency revenues after exports 
of professional services.20 Unofficial sources also indicate that Cuba’s 
international reserves increased markedly from $7.4 billion in 2011 to 
$12.1 billion at the end of 2015.21  
In another significant development, Cuba accumulated a large 
external debt in hard currency that added yet another burden to the 
country’s struggling economy. Cuba’s active or performing debt jumped 
from $5.8 billion in 2004 to $11.6 billion in 2008 as Venezuela and China 
began to extend sizable credits to Havana on far better terms than those 
granted by their competitors.22 This active debt was last reported at $11.9 
billion in 2013, of which $9.9 billion was medium- and long-term debt 
owed primarily to foreign governments.23 At that time, Cuba also owned 
an inactive or nonperforming debt of about $7.6 billion that it had not 
serviced since 1986, owed mainly to the Paris Club creditors,24 and a huge 
outstanding debt with the former Soviet Union in old transferable rubles 
that Russia claimed but the Cuban government refused to recognize. 
Albeit still worrying, the island’s debt burden has eased since then (and 
new credit lines have become available) due to debt-restructuring deals 
with Paris Club member countries, Russia, and other creditors that 
resulted in major reductions in what Cuba owed in exchange for payment 
plans it can meet. In 2014, Russia wrote off 90% of Cuba’s $35.2 billion 
debt to the Soviet Union with the understanding that Havana pay the rest 
within ten years.25 In late 2015, Paris Club creditors forgave $8.5 billion 
                                                                                                                     
[https://perma.cc/BYD8-C7XP]. 
 18.  Frank, supra note 17. 
 19.  ONEI 2016, supra note 2. 
 20.  Emilio Morales, Cuba: The Fastest Growing Remittances Market in Latin America, 
THE HAVANA CONSULTING GROUP & TECH (June 23, 2016), http://www.thehavanaconsulting 
group.com/en-US/Articles/Article/20 [https://perma.cc/7MUN-V2F6]. 
 21.  ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: CUBA (2016).  
 22.  Emily Morris, Cuba’s New Relationship with Foreign Capital: Economic Policy-
Making Since 1990, 40 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 769, 788 (2008). 
 23.  ONEI 2016, supra note 2. 
 24.  The Paris Club is an informal group of nineteen creditor nations (Western European 
countries, Japan, Russia, Australia, and the United States) providing debt relief and other kinds 
of financial assistance to debtor countries, mostly developing nations. Unlike the IMF and the 
World Bank, the Paris Club does not issue multilateral loans. 
 25.  Mark Lammey, Russia Ratifies $35bln Debt Write-off for Cuba, MOSCOW TIMES (July 
10
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of Cuba’s $11.1 billion defaulted debt (including interests, service 
charges, and penalties) and restructured payments on the reminder.26 
Cuba also negotiated follow-up bilateral deals with most Paris Club 
members in exchange for financing for development projects and struck 
debt-restructuring deals with Chinese, Mexican, and Japanese 
commercial creditors.27  
Improved access to external financing is very important for Cuba. 
Because many consider it a high credit risk, Cuba has virtually no access 
to medium- and long-term financing from foreign private lenders (banks 
and other entities), and so it must seek short-term loans at high interest 
rates. Cuba can obtain modest official loans from developed countries, 
but long-term financing in recent years has come almost exclusively from 
official lenders in a small group of friendly nations, in particular 
Venezuela, China, Brazil, and Russia.28 Trade credit from developed 
countries’ banks is generally tight even though this practice is widely 
seen as one of the least risky forms of lending. Moreover, Cuba is not a 
member of leading U.S.-led international financial institutions (IFIs) such 
as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-
American Development Bank whose wealth of knowledge and financial 
resources would serve well the current needs of the island.  
In this regard, Cuba’s changing relationship with the United States 
has the potential to encourage private and official lending and perhaps 
Cuban admission in the aforementioned IFIs.29 In December 2015, the 
credit rating agency Moody’s confirmed Cuba’s “Caa2” rating (meaning 
its “obligations are judged to be of poor standing and are subject to very 
high credit risk”) but raised the country’s outlook from stable to 
                                                                                                                     
9, 2014, 7:03 PM), https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russia-ratifies-35bln-debt-write-off-for-
cuba-37170 [https://perma.cc/L9BZ-VXSG]. 
 26.  Marc Frank & Leigh Thomas, Cuba's Debt Deal: Easy Terms, but Severe Penalties if 
Late Again, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2015, 11:01 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-debt-
exclusive-idUSKBN0TY23C20151215 [https://perma.cc/Y2J6-F7CD]. 
 27.  Marc Frank, Cuba Nears Deal with Paris Club on Debt Forgiveness, REUTERS (Dec. 
7, 2015, 10:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-debt-idUSKBN0TQ1XX20151207 
[https://perma.cc/DG3F-TMLU].  
 28.  Luis R. Luis, Cuba: External Debt and Finance in the Context of Limited Reforms, 
CUBA IN TRANSITION, Aug. 2013, at 189, http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 
09/v23-luis.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5CF-6KE5].  
 29.  PAVEL VIDAL & SCOTT BROWN, CUBA’S ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION: BEGIN WITH THE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: THE RIGHT STEP FOR IMPROVING THE LIVES OF CUBA’S 
CITIZENS 18-19 (2015), http://publications.atlanticcouncil.org/uscuba/CUBAIFI_0709_DP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X7TJ-SJ3C]; Marlén Sánchez Gutiérrez, Cost and Benefits from a Possible 
Return of Cuba to the IMF and to the World Bank. Is it Worth Exploring?, FROM THE ISLAND, 
Sept. 22, 2015, at 2, http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=4178a518-
a7d5-4611-b645-9b7da19a5315 [https://perma.cc/65J5-KPZC]. 
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positive.30 As the key drivers of the rating action, Moody’s cited 
manageable risks associated with Cuba’s reduced dependence on 
Venezuela since 2014, continued cautious reform momentum, a positive 
economic outlook that prompted the agency to boost its forecast for 
Cuba’s economic growth to 3.5% in 2016, and increased rapprochement 
with the United States.31 However, although Cuba has yet to feel the full 
brunt of the Venezuelan crisis, the latter has already caused substantial 
negative effects on the island, exposed serious problems in Cuba’s 
external sector, and highlighted key structural weaknesses of the Cuban 
economy, raising doubts about Havana’s ability to effectively manage its 
weakened ties with Caracas.  
III. PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES 
Along with its precarious financial situation, Cuba faces a number of 
critical problems that limit the adequate functioning of the external sector 
and its ability to stimulate economic growth. These include a sizable 
merchandise trade deficit, excessive trade concentration in terms of both 
products and markets, vulnerability to external trade shocks (especially 
international price swings), overreliance on export activities with low 
cross-sector spillover effects, insufficient levels of foreign investment, 
and key systemic flaws that stifle trade competitiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 30.  Moody’s Changes Cuba’s Outlook to Positive from Stable; Caa2 Rating Affirmed, 
MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-
changes-Cubas-outlook-to-positive-from-stable-Caa2-rating--PR_339779 [https://perma.cc/X5F 
Q-56AX]. 
 31.  Id. Moody’s is the only global rating agency to assign grades to Cuba.  
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Figure 3. External Trade in Goods, 2004-201532 
 
 
 
With respect to the external trade in goods, Cuba’s trade deficit has 
soared dramatically since the mid-2000s (Figure 3). Owing primarily to 
rapidly worsening terms of trade in connection with the global economic 
crisis, the island’s merchandise balance posted a deficit of more than $10 
billion in 2008, the largest ever. A combination of significant import cuts 
and growing export receipts drove the trade deficit down to about $6 
billion in 2010, a level still three times higher than that of 1990. Cuba 
continues to rely on a large amount of imports (mainly fuels, foodstuffs, 
machinery and equipment, and manufactured goods) to supplement 
insufficient domestic production and alleviate the needs of its society. It 
will likely continue to do so in the future because the stimulation of 
productive forces and the recapitalization of key national industries 
require considerable purchases from abroad. Cuba’s annual trade deficit 
in goods was nearly $8.4 billion in 2015, as the value of exports plunged 
to approximately $3.3 billion while imports, despite a sizable drop from 
their record level two years before, reached $11.7 billion. Preliminary 
estimates from official sources for 2016 also indicate that both exports 
and imports dropped further to $2.5 billion and $10.3 billion, 
                                                                                                                     
 32.  ONEI 2016, supra note 2; ONEI 2015, supra note 2; ONEI 2009, supra note 2. 
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respectively, which resulted in a trade deficit of around $7.8 billion.33  
Over the past decade, cumulative revenues from exports of goods 
were roughly one-third of what Cuba had to pay to satisfy its import 
needs. With such a weak export performance, Cuba has struggled to 
finance its merchandise trade deficit and frequently fell behind on its 
payments to foreign business partners.34 Cuban exports also are 
concentrated in just a few commodities. Only four products (nickel, 
sugar, cigars, and medicines) accounted for almost 50% of the island’s 
total merchandise export earnings in 2015.35 Even more strikingly, close 
to an additional 35% of total revenues came from oil exports, which 
consisted not only of various types of fuels produced at a joint venture 
refinery with Venezuela in Cienfuegos but also, most likely, of significant 
amounts of re-exported Venezuelan oil.36 Moreover, despite significant 
reforms aimed at bolstering agricultural output and substituting 
expensive food imports, Cuba still imports nearly 70% of the food it 
consumes, for which it pays some $2 billion each year.37 The country’s 
industrial sector has severe problems as well and has yet to recover from 
its collapse in the early 1990s.38 Notwithstanding some progress in 
certain subsectors, the physical output of the Cuban manufacturing 
industry in 2015 was only about 70% of its level in 1989. Domestically-
produced equipment has almost entirely disappeared today, and 
intermediate goods in 2015 stood at little more than 40% of their volume 
in 1989.39 It thus comes as no surprise that Cuba must purchase a great 
deal of machinery and equipment from abroad and that intermediate 
products account for the lion’s share of the country’s imports.  
Additionally, crucial trade vulnerabilities should not be overlooked. 
The international prices of Cuba’s key export and import goods tend to 
experience wide swings. For nickel and sugar exports, the supply’s lack 
of capacity to react to higher prices further complicate things.40 Almost 
                                                                                                                     
 33.  ONEI 2017, supra note 2. 
 34.  RICHARD E. FEINBERG, OPEN FOR BUSINESS: BUILDING THE NEW CUBAN ECONOMY 42 
(2016). 
 35.  Calculations of the author from ONEI 2016, supra note 2. 
 36.  CARMELO MESA-LAGO & JORGE PÉREZ-LÓPEZ, CUBA UNDER RAÚL CASTRO: ASSESSING 
THE REFORMS 8283 (2013). Calculations of the author from ONEI 2016, supra note 2.  
 37.  Marc Frank, As U.S. Food Sales to Cuba Slow, Farmers Seek End to Embargo REUTERS 
(Feb. 6, 2015, 9:30 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-cuba-food-idUSL1N0VG0PM2015 
0206 [https://perma.cc/7LFZ-E66K]. 
 38.  Archibald R. Ritter, Does Cuba Have a Future in Manufacturing?, CUBA IN 
TRANSITION, Aug. 2014, at 345, http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/v24-
ritter.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E8Y-Y7YP]. 
 39.  ONEI 2016. supra note 2. 
 40.  Jorge Mario Sánchez Egozcue, Crecimiento Económico y Sector Externo en Cuba 
(Workshop paper) (2011), available at http://thecubaneconomy.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/1 
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entirely due to price fluctuations, since production levels changed little 
(between 70,000 and 75,000 tons of nickel each year), the island’s 
revenues from nickel exports increased from $600 million in 2000 to $2.1 
billion in 2007 and dropped to $1.4 billion in 2011.41 Since then, despite 
the growing contribution of the Pedro Soto Alba plant in Moarun as a 
joint venture with the Canadian firm Sherritt InternationalCuba’s 
annual nickel output has decreased by nearly 20,000 tons due to the 
closing of an aging state-owned plant in Nicaro and maintenance work 
that affected production at another state facility in Punta Gorda. A sharp 
drop in nickel prices exacerbated the impact of low output on financial 
results, pushing export revenues down to less than half their level in 2011 
and forcing the Cuban nickel industry to step up its efforts to reduce costs 
and achieve greater efficiency.42 Mounting losses caused by plummeting 
international prices also played a major role in Cuba’s decision in the 
early 2000s to downsize its sugar industry.43 Nevertheless, a steady 
decline in sugar output in the second half of the 2000s coincided with a 
spectacular growth of prices. In 2011, when Cuba’s sugar production 
stood at just 1.24 million tons (only slightly above the 105-year low of 
1.16 million tons in 2010 and down from 4.06 million tons in 2000) and 
export revenues amounted to $360 million, prices were nearly four times 
higher than a decade earlier. Conversely, sugar output rose after 2011, 
reaching 1.9 million tons in 2015 while prices witnessed a strong 
downward trend. As a result, annual sugar export revenues remained 
practically stagnant during this period.44  
And most important of all, the recent freefall in oil prices has 
seriously hurt the Cuba-Venezuela alliance. It made it very difficult for 
Caracas to maintain its oil-assistance program to Havana, it slashed 
Cuba’s revenues from exports of refined oil products and re-exported 
Venezuelan oil, and it reduced the cash Cuba receives for the services of 
its professionals since the amount apparently is linked to oil prices 
(meaning Venezuela pays less when prices are down). Cuba indeed might 
                                                                                                                     
0/Jorge-Mario-Sanchez-Crecimiento-econ%C3%B3mico-y-sector-externo-en-Cuba.docx [https: 
//perma.cc/9DAZ-XD4K]. 
 41.  PAOLO SPADONI, CUBA’S SOCIALIST ECONOMY TODAY: NAVIGATING CHALLENGES AND 
CHANGE 66 (2014) [hereinafter SPADONI, CUBA’S SOCIALIST ECONOMY].  
 42.  Sarah Marsh, Cuba Sees Nickel Output Steady at 56,000 Tonnes; Low Prices Bite, 
REUTERS (June 13, 2016, 4:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-metals-cuba-nickel-
idUSKCN0YZ2C5 [https://perma.cc/YRX6-T76N]. 
 43.  Philip Peters, Cutting Losses: Cuba Downsizes Its Sugar Industry, LEXINGTON 
INSTITUTE (2003), http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Cuba/cutting-losses. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/RV3U-5LBP]. 
 44.  ONEI 2016, supra note 2. For nickel and sugar price trends, see World Bank data at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets [https://perma.cc/N3G9-TVNC].  
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be the only oil-importing country that prefers high crude prices. In yet 
another sign of Cuba’s vulnerability to fluctuations in commodity prices, 
foreign media reported toward the end of 2015 that Cuba once again was 
experiencing liquidity shortages and falling behind on some payments to 
foreign suppliers as steep declines in the prices of key exports such as 
refined oil products and nickel (sugar prices dropped as well) took a toll 
on the island’s finances.45 Cuba’s liquidity situation and its overall 
economic conditions have actually worsened since then, in tandem with 
a crisis in its key trading partner Venezuela.  
 
Table 2. Cuba’s Merchandise Trading Partners in 201546 
 
Destinations 
of exports 
US$ 
millions 
 
Origins of 
imports 
US$ 
millions 
 
Bilateral 
trade 
US$ 
millions 
Venezuela 1,438  Venezuela 2,794  Venezuela 4,232 
Canada 361  China 2,331  China 2,599 
China 268  Spain 1,187  Spain 1,334 
Netherlands 222  Brazil 642  Canada 727 
Spain 147  Mexico 460  Brazil 691 
Belgium 78  Italy 429  Mexico 475 
Russia 56  Argentina 369  Italy 452 
Brazil 49  Canada 366  Germany 407 
Germany 47  Germany 360  Argentina 389 
Croatia 45  Vietnam 247  Netherlands 359 
Others 639  Others 2,517  Others 3,387 
Total 3,350  Total 11,702  Total 15,052 
 
When it comes to Cuba’s trade activities (Table 2), excessive market 
concentration remains an issue of concern.47 Since 2004 there has been a 
strong reorientation of foreign trade toward countries like Venezuela, 
China, and Brazil, countries that provide government-backed credits with 
generous repayment terms, and a decline in the relative contribution of 
European nations and Canada, countries that had been the island’s 
strategic partners during the 1990s.48 But nearly 30% of Cuba’s bilateral 
                                                                                                                     
 45.  Marc Frank, Cuba in Cash Crunch Due to Low Commodity Prices, Venezuela Woes, 
REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2015, 2:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-economy-
idUSKCN0SA1U420151016 [https://perma.cc/PG6X-S2J6]. 
 46.  ONEI 2016, supra note 2. 
 47.  Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, La Economía Cubana: Evolución y Perspectivas, 
CUBAN STUD., 2016, at 35 (2016).  
 48.  SPADONI, CUBA’S SOCIALIST ECONOMY, supra note 41, at 23. 
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merchandise trade (around $4.2 billion in 2015) and the vast majority of 
its service trade are currently concentrated with a single partner, 
Venezuela, which is teetering on the edge of economic and political 
collapse.49 In effect, despite a boom in U.S. visitors and remittances amid 
a detente with the United States, the Cuban economy registered a 
contraction in 2016 and its prospects for 20172018 look grim, as annual 
GDP growth is expected to remain well below 2%.50 Cuban authorities 
have acknowledged that Venezuela’s economic woes affected its oil 
supply to Cuba and announced austerity measures that include drastic 
cuts in electricity and fuel consumption, imports, and investment.51 
Referring to the possible risks associated with this situation, a prominent 
Cuban economist claimed that Cuba’s GDP could plummet 10% if 
Havana’s special relations with Caracas fall apart completely.52  
Furthermore, although the external sector could play a critical role in 
promoting economic expansion and development, to a large extent over 
the past two and a half decades Cuba has simply replaced one engine of 
growth with another instead of diversifying its economic anchors and 
fostering new dynamic manufacturing activities. If anything, in recent 
years the Cuban economy has moved steadily toward professional 
services with fewer linkages with the production sphere than sugar and 
international tourism, the two previous leading sectors.53 Except for some 
emerging ties to the biotechnology industry, Cuban exports of medical 
services (whose growth, moreover, seems to have passed its peak) are 
largely unlinked from the rest of the domestic economy.54 Even nickel 
production has minimal ripple effects on the rest of the economy because 
nickel is extracted on the island but refined abroad.55 On the contrary, 
services like tourism and certain industries involved in producing goods 
                                                                                                                     
 49.  Peréz Villanueva, supra note 47. 
 50.  ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: CUBA (2017).  
 51.  Marc Frank, Cuba Warns of Further Belt Tightening as Venezuelan Crisis Deepens, 
REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2017, 11:59 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/cuba-economy-idUSL8N1I 
06XW [https://perma.cc/NL7C-TJET]; Nora Gámez Torres, Expertos Alertan Sobre Crisis 
Económica en Cuba, EL NUEVO HERALD (July 28, 2016, 5:34 PM), http://www.elnuevo 
herald.com/noticias/mundo/america-latina/cuba-es/article92433277.html [https://perma.cc/6V7 
Z-R2PW]; Marc Frank, Cuban Economy Minister Details Dire Austerity Measures, REUTERS 
(July 9, 2016, 9:38 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-economy-austerity-idUSKCN0 
ZP0I3 [https://perma.cc/9BVW-E2RY].  
 52.  Marc Frank, Venezuela’s Economic Woes Send a Chill Over Closest Ally Cuba, FIN. 
TIMES (July 26, 2016) (quoting Pavel Vidal).  
 53.  Alberto Gabriele, Cuba: From State Socialism to a New Form of Market Socialism?, 
53 COMP. ECON. STUD. 647, 657 (2011). 
 54.  Id. at 65960.  
 55.  Antonio F. Romero G., Los Desafíos de las Relaciones Económicas Externas de Cuba, 
CUBAN STUD. 151 (2016). 
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(e.g., sugar) can have considerable multiplier effects.56 Medical 
internationalism provides substantial material benefits to Cuba, but it can 
hardly constitute a tool for stimulating long-term economic development. 
Sustained growth requires a more diversified export base, improvements 
in productive capacities, and especially the enactment of structural 
reforms to enhance the role of market forces in the Cuban economy. 
In effect, the Cuban economy suffers, above all, from severe 
structural problems. Among them are a weak capacity to generate 
domestic savings to support investment, relative price distortions 
stemming from government controls that stifle market mechanisms, and 
a dual monetary system with multiple exchange rates (which Havana’s 
authorities have vowed to eliminate) that creates strongly segmented 
spheres of economic activity, diminishes linkages between enterprises, 
and discourages foreign investment.57 All of these problems conspire to 
defeat achieving higher efficiency and productivity and improving the 
quality of Cuban goods and services, thereby diminishing the country’s 
competitiveness in the area of foreign trade.58 Put simply, internal factors 
weigh even more heavily than external ones on the performance of 
Cuba’s external sector and of its general economy.  
Insufficient gross capital formation, which fell from 14.8% of GDP 
in 2008 to 9.4% in 2015, is also a major debilitating factor for the Cuban 
economy and warrants further discussion.59 Over the past twenty-five 
years, the annual accumulation rates have been consistently and notably 
lower than during the 1970s and 1980s. Remarkably, the ratio of gross 
capital formation to GDP was 25.6% in 1989.60 Cuba requires annual 
results similar to those of 1989 to reverse the decapitalization of key 
sectors and spur a lasting recovery of its economy, yet such numbers will 
be difficult to achieve without improved efficiency. Besides, Cuba has 
regularly failed to meet its planned domestic investment targets, in part 
due to external financial constraints but also because of inadequate 
                                                                                                                     
 56.  Id. at 15152.  
 57.  Monetary duality and multiple exchange rates generate a number of hidden subsidies 
and produce distortions in almost all economic measurements, to the point that it is nearly 
impossible to gauge the true profitability of enterprises. PAVEL VIDAL ALEJANDRO & OMAR 
EVERLENY PÉREZ VILLANUEVA, LA REFORMA MONETARIA EN CUBA HASTA EL 2016: ENTRE 
GRADUALIDAD Y “BIG BANG” 11 (2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 
06/monetary-reform-cuba-2016-alejandro-villanueva.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAT5-B9DW]. 
 58.  José Antonio Alonso & Pavel Vidal Alejandro, Introducción: La Incierta Senda de las 
Reformas, in ¿QUO VADIS, CUBA? LA INCIERTA SENDA DE LAS REFORMAS 11, 1315 (José Antonio 
Alonso & Pavel Vidal eds., 2013). 
 59.  ONEI 2016 supra note 2; ONEI 2009 supra note 2. 
 60.  ONEI 1996, supra note 1. 
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organization, slow execution, and other operational flaws.61 Despite its 
low levels, foreign investment has played a crucial role in all of the 
industries (oil, electricity, nickel, tourism, and telecommunications) that 
have experienced the highest growth since the early 1990s and enhanced 
the performance of Cuba’s largest export sectors.62 But the number of 
economic associations with overseas partners (including with Venezuela) 
on the island has fallen sharply in recent years and it remains to be seen 
whether Cuba’s intensified efforts to bring badly needed foreign capital 
to its economy will be successful. At the end of 2015, only 214 foreign 
investment businesses operated in Cuba, mostly in the areas of tourism 
and real estate, energy and mining, and industrial activities, as seen in 
Table 3. They were primarily joint ventures and economic association 
contracts (hotel management agreements and oil exploration contracts), 
and only 4% were 100% foreign capital companies. 
 
Table 3. Foreign Investment Businesses in Cuba by Sector and Type 
in 2015 (year-end percentage distribution)63 
 
Sector  Type  
Tourism and real estate 47% 
Joint ventures 48% Energy and mining 12% 
Industry 9% 
Foods 5% 
International economic 
association contracts 
48% Transportation 5% 
Agro-sugar industry 4% 
Construction 4% 
100% foreign capital 
companies 
4% Other sectors 14% 
Total 100% 
 
Along with declarations by Havana’s officials that foreign investment 
will now transcend its current complementary role to domestic 
investment efforts to soon occupy a major role in the economy,64 Cuba 
                                                                                                                     
 61.  Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, Análisis de la Evolución Reciente de la Economía 
Cubana, in MIRADAS A LA ECONOMÍA CUBANA: ENTRE LA EFICIENCIA ECONÓMICA Y LA EQUIDAD 
SOCIAL 17 (Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva et al. eds., 2013). 
 62.  SPADONI, CUBA’S SOCIALIST ECONOMY, supra note 41, at 10409.  
 63.  Calculations of the author using MINISTERIO DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR Y LA INVERSIÓN 
EXTRANJERA, CUBA: CARTERA DE OPORTUNIDADES DE INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA 2016-2017, at 12 
(2016), http://bohemia.cu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Cartera-de-Oportunidades-de-Inversi%C 
3%B3n-Extranjera-2016-2017.pdf [hereinafter MINCEX]. 
 64.  Prensa Latina, Cuba, Empresa Estatal Debe Ser Más Activa en Atracción Capital, 
DIARIO OCTUBRE (Apr. 1, 2016), https://diario-octubre.com/archivo1/2016/04/01/cuba-empresa-
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enacted a more attractive foreign investment legislation in June 2014 
(approved in March 2014) to replace Law 77 of 1995. The new Law 118 
beefed up investment security, reduced the tax on profits in half from 
30% to 15%, exempted new investors from paying it for eight years, and 
eliminated payroll taxes, although 100% foreign-owned investments still 
need special approval from the Cuban government to qualify for these 
fiscal benefits.65 The latter are reserved for joint ventures with state 
enterprises and associations with cooperatives.66 Moreover, overseas 
firms must continue to hire local workers through a Cuban employment 
agency and they cannot establish partnerships with Cuban independent 
entrepreneurs (cuentapropistas).67 Constructed in partnership with 
Brazil’s engineering group Odebrecht and with financial backing from 
the Brazilian government, in late 2013 Cuba also opened its first special 
development zone (Zona Especial de Desarrollo Mariel, ZEDM) around 
a new container terminal at the port of Mariel.68 As established by Decree 
Law 313, foreign investors in the ZEDM receive even better tax breaks 
and other incentives than those under Law 118. They can have 100% 
ownership during contracts of up to 50 years (renewable), pay virtually 
no labor taxes, enjoy a ten-year exoneration from taxes on profits and 
then pay 12%, and are allowed to import and export goods mostly duty-
free with less red tape.69 But they still cannot directly hire and fire their 
Cuban employees.70 
A country that has received no more than $5 billion in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) since it authorized the first joint venture with a foreign 
partner in the late 1980s, Cuba is now seeking $2 billion to $2.5 billion 
in FDI per year to achieve annual capital accumulation rates of 2025% 
of GDP and annual economic growth rates of at least 5%.71 In November 
                                                                                                                     
estatal-debe-ser-mas-activa-en-atraccion-capital/ [https://perma.cc/C7YJ-FTL]; Exploran nuevas 
oportunidades, OPCIONES, Jan. 17, 2014. 
 65.  Ley No. 118 Ley de la Inversión Extranjera [Law on Foreign Investment] 20 GAC. OF. 
177, arts. 11, 36.1 (Cuba, Apr. 16, 2014) (article 11 deals with registration; article 36.1 cuts taxes 
to 15%). 
 66.  Id. arts. 10, 15. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Odebrecht InfrastructureLatin America Finalizes Revitalization of Mariel Port in 
Cuba, ODEBRECHT.COM (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.odebrecht.com/en/odebrecht-infrastructur 
e-latin-america-finalizes-revitalization-mariel-port-cuba [https://perma.cc/ZFZ8-MLY4]. 
 69.  Decreto-Ley No. 313 De la Zona Especial de Desarrollo Mariel [Decree on the Mariel 
Special Development Zone] 26 GAC. OF. arts. 20, 57, 58 (Cuba, Sep. 23, 2013). 
 70.  Id. art. 31. 
 71.  José Luis Rodríguez, Valoraciones Externas Sobre la Inversión Extranjera en Cuba, 
CUBA CONTEMPORÁNEA, Oct. 1, 2015, available at http://www.cubadebate.cu/opinion/2015/ 
11/05/valoraciones-externas-sobre-la-inversion-extranjera-en-cuba/#.WX9TyYTyvRZ [https:// 
perma.cc/PA43-6GBJ]. 
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2016, the Cuban government unveiled a new portfolio of business 
opportunities for foreign investment in Cuba that listed 395 projects 
valued at $9.5 billion. It focused on projects related to tourism, oil 
exploration, energy, agriculture, and construction, and included several 
proposals for industrial and biotechnology/pharmaceutical projects in the 
ZEDM.72 Nevertheless, from March 2014 to November 2016, Cuba 
approved only 83 new foreign investment businesses (15 of them in the 
ZEDM) worth just $1.3 billion.73 The aforementioned annual targets of 
FDI inflows and GDP growth envisioned by the Cuban government may 
prove impossible to reach without deeper economic reforms, significant 
improvements in Cuba’s business environment, and an ideological shift 
away from entrenched prejudices toward foreign investment.74 
IV. POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
Although relations between the United States and Cuba have become 
more confrontational since Donald Trump entered the White House, the 
Obama-era engagement with Havana demonstrated how improved 
relations with its powerful northern neighbor could open up new, 
beneficial economic opportunities for Cuba, even more so now that shock 
waves from Venezuela’s economic malaise have finally reached the 
island. On December 17, 2014 (17D), Barack Obama and Raúl Castro 
announced in simultaneous televised speeches the beginning of a historic 
process of rapprochement between their countries after more than a half-
century of unremitting hostility.75 Most importantly, the U.S. President 
announced a series of measures aimed at fostering economic ties with 
Cuba and urged Congress to start working to end the long-standing 
embargo against the island, the main provisions of which are codified 
under the Torricelli law of 1992, the Helms-Burton law of 1996, and the 
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) of 2000.76  
                                                                                                                     
 72.  MINCEX, supra note 63, at 18. 
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Besides reaching an agreement with Havana for the re-establishment 
of full diplomatic relations, Obama issued six sets of amendments to 
sanctions regulations after the 17D, relaxing restrictions on travel, 
remittances, trade, investment, banking, and other commercial dealings 
with Cuba.77 While it is too early to fully evaluate these measures, 
especially given President Trump’s apparent goal to reverse most of 
Obama’s policies, it is safe to argue that they had significant effects in 
certain areas, but their combined impact on the Cuban economy will 
continue to be severely limited by a codified embargo.78 In particular, 
there are still major restrictions on U.S.-Cuba bilateral trade and U.S. 
direct investment in Cuba, a prohibition on travel to the island for tourism 
purposes, a number of financial restrictions, and the extraterritorial 
measures of sanctions.79 Progress will also depend on Havana’s 
willingness to approve the commercial and financial activities authorized 
by Washington, on any additional sanctions imposed by Trump, and on 
the economic reforms that Raúl Castro is implementing as part of the 
update of the Cuban socialist economic model.80 Regardless of the U.S. 
stance on Cuba, the country still needs to complete the process of 
currency and exchange rate unification, reduce bureaucratic and 
administrative hurdles that stifle entrepreneurial activity, improve its 
financial and legal systems, and expand and renovate key 
infrastructures.81  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
387, § 7208 (Oct. 28, 2000). 
 77.  Cuba: Revisions to License Exceptions, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,36567 (Oct. 17, 2016); 
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,37278 (Sept. 17, 2016); Cuba: Revisions to 
License Exceptions and Licensing Policy, 81 Fed. Reg. 13,97274 (March 16, 2016); Cuban 
Assets Control Regulation, 81 Fed. Reg. 458386 (Jan. 27, 2016); Cuba Licensing Policy 
Revisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 458083 (Jan. 27, 2016); Cuban Assets Control Regulation, 80 Fed. Reg. 
56,91526 (Sept. 21, 2015); Enhancing Support for the Cuban People, 80 Fed. Reg. 56,898904 
(Sept. 21, 2015); Cuba: Implementing Rescission of State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation, 80 
Fed. Reg. 43,31420 (July 22, 2015). See also Cuban Assets Control Regulations; Terrorism List 
Governments Sanctions Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 34,05354 (June 15, 2015); Cuba: Providing 
Support for the Cuban People, 80 Fed. Reg. 2286302 (Jan. 16, 2015).  
 78.  22 U.S.C. § 6032 (2012). 
 79.  See generally Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101 et seq. (2017). 
 80.  Fulton Armstrong, U.S.-Cuba: Laying the Groundwork for Normal Relations 1 (Am. 
Univ. Ctr. for Latin Am. & Latino Studies, Policy Brief No. 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/ VG2C-
C37M. 
 81.  Id. at 34. 
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Figure 4. U.S. Visitors to Cuba, 2009201682 
 
 
 
A considerable increase of travelers to Cuba from the United States, 
especially U.S. citizens of non-Cuban origin, is one of the most visible 
direct effects of Obama’s regulatory changes, as seen in Figure 4. Cuban 
official statistics make a distinction between Cuban Americans who 
travel to Cuba with a Cuban passport and American citizens entering the 
island with a U.S. passport.83 This latter segment of visitors has remained 
well below its potential due to travel restrictions imposed by 
Washington’s government. Annual trips to Cuba by U.S. citizens of non-
Cuban origin did not reach 100,000 until the year between 2014 and 
2015.84 On the other hand, the Cuban-American segment experienced 
notable dynamism following Obama’s decision in 2009 to eliminate all 
restrictions on family visits (and family remittances) to Cuba.85 The 
                                                                                                                     
 82.  José Luis Perelló Cabrera, El Turismo Internacional en Cuba: Escenario Reciente (July 
2017) (unpublished working paper) (on file with author) [hereinafter Perelló Cabrera, El Turismo 
Internacional]; see also José Luis Perelló Cabrera, Desarrollo del Turismo en Cuba: Tendencias, 
Políticas, E Impactos Futuros, CUBA IN TRANSITION, Aug. 2016, at 231, http://www.ascecuba.org/ 
c/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/perello.pdf [https://perma.cc/9274-EAJE] [hereinafter Perelló 
Cabrera, Desarrollo del Turismo]. 
 83.  Anyone who permanently left Cuba after December 31, 1970, must have a valid Cuban 
passport to visit the island. 
 84.  Perelló Cabrera, Desarrollo del Turismo, supra note 82, at 231. 
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annual number of Cuban Americans traveling to Cuba rose from 163,019 
in 2009 to 258,837 in 2014.86 
The post-17D growth of U.S.-based travel to Cuba has been 
impressive. Annual trips to the island by U.S. citizens of non-Cuban 
descent almost tripled between 2014 (91,254) and 2016 (282,621). 
During the same period, Cuban-American trips grew 33.1% to reach 
344,522 in 2016.87 Actually, with the notable exception of Canada, 
international arrivals to Cuba from virtually all countries increased, to 
some extent to anticipate a looming avalanche of U.S. tourists.88 The flow 
of U.S. visitors to Cuba received further stimulus from new rules in 2016 
allowing Americans to travel to the island independently for non-
academic educational purposes (people-to-people category) without 
having to go in organized groups, from the launch of non-stop daily 
commercial flights between the United States and Cuba,89 and from the 
resumption of cruise services between the two countries. All of this made 
it easier for Americans to go to Cuba (arrivals of U.S. citizens of non-
Cuban origin more than doubled in the first half of 2017 while Cuban-
American trips grew 80%90), reduced travel costs, and greatly diluted the 
ban on tourism since U.S. officials, despite some monitoring, practically 
used the honor system to regulate authorized travel to the island. It also 
meant higher revenues for the Cuban government as well as more money 
in the hands of ordinary Cubans through tips and various private activities 
(gastronomy, taxi, and lodging, among others) geared toward tourists. 
But the flow of U.S. travelers unleashed by the removal of the ban on 
tourism would still be enormous. Some studies estimated that more than 
1 million U.S. citizens would visit Cuba in the short run if travel 
prohibitions were entirely abolished and that between 1.5 million and 3.5 
million would visit there annually once the market has fully adjusted.91 
                                                                                                                     
 86.  Perelló Cabrera, Desarrollo del Turismo, supra note 82, at 231. 
 87.  Perelló Cabrera, El Turismo Internacional, supra note 82. 
 88.  ONEI 2017, supra note 2. 
 89.  Alan Gomez, First U.S. Commercial Flight in 5 Decades Lands in Cuba, USA TODAY 
(Aug. 31, 2016, 5:52 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/ 2016/08/31/fir st-
united-states-commercial-flight-cuba/89595932/ [https://perma.cc/9V7U-34AC]. Previously 
limited to charter flights, regularly scheduled passenger jet services between U.S. cities and Cuban 
cities other than Havana started at the end of August 2016. Commercial flights to Havana began 
in October 2016.  
 90.  Perelló Cabrera, El Turismo Internacional, supra note 82. 
 91.  See, e.g., Calvin Djiofack et al., The Impact of Easing the US Travel Restrictions 
against Cuba on Tourism in the OECS, WORLD BANK MACROECONOMICS & FISCAL MGMT. MFM 
PRAC. NOTES, June 2015, at 1, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/652211468189551 
620/pdf/97687-BRI-Macroeconomics-and-Fiscal-Management-practice-note-Box391486B-PU 
BLIC-MFM-Practice-Note-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/EG4L-MJ6C]; Gerardo González Núñez & 
Roberto Orro Fernández, El Turismo Cubano: ¿Cuántos Norteamericanos Puede Cuba Recibir?, 
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The significance of Obama’s policy initiatives toward Cuba goes well 
beyond their effects on travel and tourism activities. The Washington-
Havana thaw fueled interest among U.S. firms in pursuing various kinds 
of business operations in the Cuban market despite a continued 
prohibition (except in the telecommunications sector and a few additional 
areas) on direct investments. International rivals from Europe, Canada, 
Brazil, and China have a clear head start in Cuba and they too are seeking 
new business deals, but U.S. investors could catch up quickly and be 
competitive in practically all Cuban priority sectors if the embargo were 
lifted. The United States has a number of advantages, in particular its 
highly diversified and efficient private sector that is well-suited to tackle 
Cuba’s investment needs, the financial strength of its companies, and its 
geographical proximity that would keep transportation and delivery costs 
relatively low and thus improve the cost structure and price 
competitiveness of productive activities with U.S. involvement on the 
island.92 Normal relations with the United States would also be the key 
to guarantee the future success of the Mariel project given that its 
prospects are hampered by the fact that exports and transshipments to the 
U.S. market remain off-limits because of the embargo.93 
Representatives of U.S. firms flooded Cuba after the 17D even though 
the initial wave of enthusiasm has given way to a more cautious approach 
due to business barriers, the election of President Trump, and the Cuban 
government’s timid embrace of new economic opportunities except for 
its clear interest in tourism-related projects and some telecommunications 
deals. American companies clearly are beginning to position themselves 
in the Cuban tourism market. Six U.S. air carriers (Delta, United, JetBlue, 
American Airlines, Southwest, Alaska Airlines) currently offer 
commercial flights to Cuba and five U.S. cruise companies (Carnival, 
Royal Caribbean, Pearl Seas, Norwegian C.L., Viking Cruises) sail to the 
island.94 With special permission from the U.S. Treasury Department, 
                                                                                                                     
CUBA IN TRANSITION, Aug. 2011, at 421, http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ 
v21-gonzalezorro.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QFL-HYZB]; Rafael Romeu, Vacation Over: 
Implications for the Caribbean of Opening U.S.-Cuba Tourism 14 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. WP/08/162, 2008), http://www.imf.org/~/media/websites/ imf/imported-full-text-
pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/_wp 08162.ashx [https://perma.cc/2CJJ-2GTB]; U.S. INT’L TRADE 
COMM’N, PUBL’N NO. 3932, U.S. AGRICULTURAL SALES TO CUBA: CERTAIN ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
OF U.S. RESTRICTIONS 3-14 – 3-17 (2007), https://www.usitc.gov/ publications/332/pub3932.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6QFG-78PX]. 
 92.  Emilio Morales, Los Grandes Retos del Deshielo, CUBA IN TRANSITION, Aug. 2015, at 
1415, http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/v25-morales.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/RB98-VQKF]. 
 93.  Id. at 12. 
 94.  For the complete list of U.S. companies doing business in Cuba as of June 2017, see 
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Starwood Hotels and Resorts signed deals to refurbish and manage two 
state-owned hotels in Havana and opened its first facility, Hotel Quinta 
Avenida, in June 2016.95 Marriott, Hyatt, Carlson, Hilton, and other 
major U.S. hotel chains have had meetings with Cuban authorities to run 
hotels in Cuba though no deals have yet been signed.96 The online hotel 
reservation services Booking.com (owned by the Priceline Group), 
TripAdvisor, and Expedia all reached agreements with several Cuban 
hotels to join their booking system.97 And the online lodging service 
Airbnb has allowed U.S. travelers to book stays in homes in Cuba through 
its website since April 2015, and was later authorized to offer its listings 
in Cuba, about 19,000 total, to all international travelers to the island.98  
To truly take off, the American business incursion into the Cuban 
market needs the active involvement of the big U.S. financial and telecom 
firms to facilitate payments and fund transfers and ensure infrastructure 
improvements (especially Internet connectivity). New York-based IDT 
Corporation reached a deal with Cuba’s telecom monopoly ETECSA to 
resume direct telephone connections between the United States and 
Cuba.99 Verizon, Sprint, T-Mobile, and AT&T signed agreements with 
ETECSA to offer roaming services on the island, but at very high prices 
and with slow and limited access to Internet.100 Multiple U.S. proposals 
                                                                                                                     
U.S.-CUBA TRADE & ECON. COUNCIL, Updated List: United States Companies with a Presence in 
Cuba Since 17 December 2014 (June 22, 2017) http://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/6/22/ 
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 95.  Sarah Marsh, Cuba Hotel Becomes First to Operate Under U.S. Brand, REUTERS (June 
28, 2016, 6:24 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa-tourism-idUSKCN0ZD 2VF 
[https://perma.cc/ZP6B-7H9D]. 
 96.  Mike Stone & Mitra Taj, U.S. Hotel Chains Circle Cuba as Visitors Surge, Restrictions 
Ease, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2015, 1:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/cuba-usa-hotels-
idUSL5N11Y00K20150930 [https://perma.cc/DH4G-3P3N]. 
 97.  Mimi Dwyer, Priceline Unit Booking.com Strikes Cuba Deal for Americans, REUTERS 
(Mar. 21, 2016, 6:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa-priceline-group-
idUSKCN0WN0X7 [https://perma.cc/PE56-JALY]; Melanie Lieberman, TripAdvisor Adds 
Booking for Trips to Cuba, FORTUNE (Oct. 29, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/29/ tripadvisor-
booking-cuba-travel/ [https://perma.cc/7LWZ-YF75]; Sarah Marsh, Expedia Begins Offering 
Online Booking for Hotels in Cuba, REUTERS (May 23, 2017, 7:23 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa-expedia-idUSKBN18J1ID [https://perma.cc/3GTG-
6R2V].  
 98.  Suzette Laboy, What’s Behind Airbnb’s Overnight Success in Cuba? CUBA TRADE 
MAGAZINE (May 23, 2017, 12:18 PM), http://www.cubatrademagazine.com/whats-behind-
airbnbs-overnight-success-cuba/ [https://perma.cc/GG8F-TER9].   
 99.  Daniel Trotta, U.S. Telecoms Firm IDT Establishes Direct Connection with Cuba, 
REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2015, 4:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa-idt-corp-
idUSKBN0M72DV20150311 [https://perma.cc/2ASF-XYMM]. 
 100.  Aishwarya Venugopal, AT&T Signs Deal to Offer Roaming Services in Cuba, REUTERS 
(Aug. 22, 2016, 12:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa-at-t-idUSKCN10X1RO 
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to roll out an undersea fiber optic cable between Miami and Havana to 
boost connectivity have thus far been fruitless.101 Google recently signed 
a deal to bring high-speed Internet to Cuba, though its impact will be 
minimal due to the limited number of Cubans who have access to the 
internet.102 In the financial sector, Florida-based Stonegate Bank and 
Puerto Rico-based Banco Popular issued credit cards (MasterCard) for 
use on the island by U.S. travelers.103 Stonegate also set up a 
correspondent account in Cuba and has issued a debit card.104 However, 
many U.S. banks remain reluctant to establish operations in Cuba due to 
certain embargo rules as well as the country’s inadequate legal and 
physical infrastructures.105 Add to these obstacles the major stumbling 
blocks placed by codified sanctions on U.S. firms seeking to invest in 
Cuba, then the slow progress in this area seems hardly surprising.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
[https://perma.cc/D5K6-QC2Q]. 
 101.  Mimi Whitefield, Cuba Still Wary of U.S. Telecom and Internet Offers, MIAMI HERALD 
(Jan. 25, 2016, 6:08 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/ 
cuba/article56522473.html [https://perma.cc/5A6T-8X27]. 
 102.  Alan Gomez, Google Inks Deal with Cuba to Speed Up Internet Service, USA TODAY 
(Dec. 12, 2016, 1:58 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/12/12/google-
cuba-sign-deal-speed-up-internet-service/95337148/ [https://perma.cc/GZ2Z-CTX6]. 
 103.  Mimi Whitefield, American and Cuban Bankers Hold Historic Meeting, MIAMI 
HERALD (Aug. 8, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/ 
americas/cuba/article93981267.html [https://perma.cc/X3AB-CCBZ]. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id.  
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Figure 5. U.S. Investments in Selected Foreign Companies with 
Joint Ventures in Cuba, 2015106 
 
 
 
With respect to future U.S. business operations in Cuba, an important 
and largely unexplored issue revolves around the fact that under the 
embargo, most direct investments in Cuba are prohibited. The U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, however, allows individuals and firms 
subject to U.S. law to invest in a third-country company that has 
commercial activities in Cuba so long as: (1) they do not acquire a 
controlling interest; and (2) a majority of the revenues of the third-
country company are not produced from operations within the communist 
island.107 Thus, provided that the investment is indirect, a U.S. entity 
should have no problem in building a Cuba-related stock portfolio. 
Critically, in an increasingly globalized world, the nationality of 
multinational corporations based on the location of their headquarters 
may not necessarily reflect the geographical distribution of their share 
capital. Indeed, there is substantial U.S. capital in various foreign firms 
that operate in the Cuban market.108 For instance, as seen in Figure 4, in 
                                                                                                                     
 106.  PERNOD RICARD, ANNUAL REPORT 2014/2015, at 113, https://www.pernod-
ricard.com/en/media/publications-and-reports/reports/annual-report-20142015/ [https://perma. 
cc/HB2N-XE7G]; IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP PLC, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2015, at 44, 
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N97V]; NESTLÉ, ANNUAL REVIEW 2015, at 55, https://www.nestle.com/asset-library/documents/ 
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The name in parentheses is the name of the entity in Cuba controlled by the companies. 
 107.  U.S.-CUBA TRADE & ECON. COUNCIL, COMMERCIAL HIGHLIGHTS 31 (2000), 
http://www.cubatrade.org (follow Commercial Highlights hyperlink under “Publications & 
Resources”) [https://perma.cc/RDB8-9GZ2]. 
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2015 U.S. investors owned close to 40% of France-based Pernod Ricard, 
more shares of the company than any other group of institutional 
investors. As well, U.S. investors also owned nearly one-third of United 
Kingdom-based Imperial Tobacco and 27% of Switzerland-based Nestlé. 
These firms run profitable joint ventures with the Cuban government, 
respectively in the areas of rum, premium cigars, and soft drinks and 
mineral waters. If restrictions on U.S. direct investments in Cuba are 
completely eliminated, many U.S. enterprises will be able to launch new 
projects on the island and compete with other investors, but in some cases 
they might simply purchase a company and start running a business 
already on the ground. 
Progress in the area of trade has also been slow. As indicated in Figure 
6, U.S. exports of food and agricultural products to Cuba, as authorized 
under the TSRA of 2000, mainly frozen chicken, soybean products, and 
corn, plunged from their record level of $710 million in 2008 to $171 
million in 2015, with a small recovery in 2016 to $232 million.109 This 
trend largely resulted from Cuba’s preference for purchases from 
government-controlled entities of Brazil, Argentina, Canada, and some 
European countries that offer credit and favorable payment terms. 
Purchases from U.S. firms instead must be completed with cash in 
advance payments (redefined under Obama from “cash before shipment” 
to “cash before transfer of title”)110 or through third-party guarantees 
from foreign banks.111 Allowing the use of credit facilities would ensure 
a more level playing field for U.S. agricultural traders vis-à-vis 
competitors and create new export opportunities for them.112  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 109.  U.S.-CUBA TRADE & ECON. COUNCIL, ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA (2017), 
http://www.cubatrade.org (follow Economic Eye on Cuba & Special Reports2015 to present 
hyperlink under “Publications & Resources”) [https://perma.cc/R2MH-JUFY] [hereinafter ECON. 
EYE ON CUBA 2017]. 
 110.  Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 2, 29193 (Jan. 16, 2015). 
 111.  U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., AES-87, U.S.-CUBA AGRICULTURAL TRADE: 
PAST, PRESENT, AND POSSIBLE FUTURE (2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/ 
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Figure 6. U.S. Exports of Food and Agricultural Products to Cuba, 
2001–2016113 
 
 
 
In addition, even if Obama expanded the list of American products 
that can be exported to Cuba with U.S. financing,114 very few U.S. traders 
have so far secured deals with Havana to sell newly authorized items. To 
be fair, navigating Cuban laws, policies, priorities, and the many agencies 
needed to win approval of business deals is quite challenging. But when 
it comes to U.S. commercial operations involving Cuba, major regulatory 
and financial hurdles and restrictions imposed by Washington remain in 
place. For instance, Cuba’s growing tourism industry provides good 
opportunities for American traders, and yet U.S. exports that earn 
revenues for the Cuban government, such as those from the tourism 
sector, are generally prohibited.115 A recent study by the U.S. 
International Trade Commission found that U.S. exports of agricultural 
and manufactured products to Cuba could increase by $1.4 billion to $1.8 
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billion in the medium term (within 5 years) if the United States fully lifted 
its restrictions on trade with the island.116 It also found that if the United 
States reduced Cuban import barriers (policies, institutional factors, and 
infrastructure limitations), U.S. exports of agricultural and manufactured 
goods could increase by an additional $442 million.117  
Moreover, Washington’s plans to foster U.S. trade with Cuba’s 
incipient private sector face far greater challenges than those targeting 
business deals with the Cuban government. Along with microfinancing 
and training projects, Obama authorized U.S. exports of construction 
materials and equipment to Cuba for use by local farmers and private 
entrepreneurs as well as U.S. imports of certain goods and services from 
Cuban cuentapropistas and private cooperatives.118 Exports of U.S. 
equipment, spare parts, and other goods to Cuban private entrepreneurs 
would help them increase productivity and expand operations. The 
possibility of selling to the U.S. market could inspire cuentapropistas and 
cooperatives on the island to start creating products and services for 
export. However, it will not be easy for Cuba’s non-state economic actors 
to develop profitable export businesses since their activities are focused 
on the internal market and they are confronted with legal restrictions, 
logistical problems, and difficulties in handling payments as a result of 
both U.S. and Cuban rules.119 On the Cuban side, many local 
professionals, whose services might be in demand in the U.S. market, are 
not permitted to be self-employed in their areas of expertise.120 Moreover, 
neither cuentapropistas nor cooperatives in Cuba can import and export 
goods or services without a license from their government.121 After the 
addition of coffee in April 2016 to the list of eligible U.S. imports from 
independent Cuban entrepreneurs, Nestlé’s Nespresso obtained a license 
from the U.S. Department of Treasury to sell Cuban coffee, grown by 
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small farmers on the island, in the United States, but the firm had to 
purchase the beans in Europe via Cuban state-owned export 
companies.122 In early 2017, charcoal produced by private cooperatives 
became the first Cuban product legally exported to the United States in 
over five decades, but trade was completed through a Cuban state-run 
export firm.123 
In any case, Obama’s measures on Cuba most likely boosted the flow 
of remittances from the United States, which Cuban entrepreneurs 
increasingly used to set up small private businesses.124 While the United 
States has allowed unlimited family remittances since 2009, all limits on 
donative (non-family) remittances and on remittances to support the 
development of private businesses in Cuba have now been eliminated.125 
These changes also provided impetus for the development of more 
efficient money transfer systems. Colorado-based Western Union, which 
has served Cuba since 1999, recently began to offer remittance services 
from the United States and other countries into Cuba via the company’s 
mobile application and website.126 Another U.S. company, Paypal, said it 
would start allowing remittances to Cuba through its service Xoom, 
which specializes in digital money transfers.127 In March 2016, citing new 
rules that allow U.S. banks to open and maintain accounts for Cuban 
nationals, the U.S. online payments firm Stripe said it would launch its 
services in Cuba, aimed at Cuban tech startups that want to sell their 
products or services to U.S. customers.128 PayPal and Stripe, though, have 
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yet to begin offering their services in Cuba.129 Put simply, even if U.S. 
business dealings with Cuba’s independent economic actors remain 
complicated, expanding remittances and the removal of impediments to 
Cubans accessing international financial services will reduce barriers to 
entrepreneurship on the island, contribute to investment in small 
businesses, and stimulate the growth of Cuba’s private sector.  
Finally, President Trump’s new measures on Cuba, announced in 
June 2017, added yet another obstacle to deeper U.S.-Cuba economic ties. 
Arguing that Obama had negotiated a “terrible and misguided deal” with 
Havana,130 Trump ordered tighter restrictions on travel to and commercial 
dealings with Cuba. The new rules prohibit individual people-to people 
trips (the most popular travel category) to the island and require them to 
be part of organized groups, call for stricter enforcement of the tourism 
ban, prohibit U.S. companies from doing business with firms owned or 
controlled by the Cuban military, and condition improvements in U.S.-
Cuba relations on Cuba’s willingness to foster political and economic 
freedoms.131 Though falling significantly short of undoing Obama’s 
policies, Trump’s measures could potentially lead to a sizable drop in 
U.S.-based travel to Cuba. Furthermore, they might (1) hurt the Cuban 
private sector because organized groups tend to rely on state-run services 
for logistical reasons; (2) reduce business for U.S. airlines and travel 
firms; and (3) make it very difficult for U.S. companies to pursue new 
business deals in Cuba because the Cuban military controls a large share 
of the country’s economy.132 
V. CONCLUSION 
Today’s Cuban economy is essentially a service economy with a 
feeble production base, serious systemic flaws, and an external sector that 
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remains incapable of stimulating and sustaining high growth rates. 
Cuba’s external sector has experienced significant changes in the last two 
decades or so, above all in the area of foreign trade. Service trade has 
eclipsed merchandise trade. A special oil-for-doctors arrangement with 
Venezuela converted exports of medical and other professional services 
into Cuba’s largest source of hard currency revenues and main engine of 
growth. International tourism is another vital source of foreign exchange 
earnings along with expanding remittances from overseas migrants. 
Major changes to the structure of merchandise trade have also occurred, 
with sugar relinquishing its traditional leading role within exports to 
nickel and oil products, and Venezuela emerging as Cuba’s top trading 
partner. 
There are some recent positive developments. Sizable inflows from 
medical service sales to Venezuela generated surpluses in Cuba’s overall 
trade and current account balances. Largely in default for decades, the 
island’s external debt received substantial relief from a generous debt-
restructuring arrangement with Paris Club member nations, along with 
deals with other creditors, opening the door for future official credits and 
loan guarantees from developed countries that Havana hopes will 
compensate for the newly negotiated payment obligations. Furthermore, 
Cuba’s international reserves appear to have risen notably. Albeit unable 
to bring in enough foreign resources for the Cuban economy to operate at 
high level of capacity and efficiency, the external sector was able to 
ensure positive GDP growth rates, at least until 2015. Finally, some new 
foreign investment businesses were formed in Cuba as the terms for 
overseas investors have improved. 
There are nonetheless critical problems that negatively affect the 
performance of the Cuban external sector. Heavily dependent on 
imported goods, Cuba continues to run a large merchandise trade deficit 
that places significant strain on the country’s external finances. The 
Cuban government’s availability of foreign exchange is greatly reduced 
by insufficient levels of merchandise exports, little export diversification, 
and poor results from ongoing import substitution programs. Moreover, 
Cuba is exposed to volatile swings in the international prices of nickel, 
sugar, and oil products that strongly impact its export revenues and its 
import expenditures. An additional problem is that the service export 
sector, apart from tourism activities, has little connections with domestic 
production because professional services generate minimal multiplier 
effects on the rest of the economy. It is indeed very difficult to develop a 
service economy independently from the national industrial base. Cuba’s 
low international competitiveness in the area of foreign trade is also the 
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result of insufficient levels of domestic and foreign investment, over 
centralization, and other shortcomings of the socialist economic system. 
To further complicate things, a profound economic crisis in Venezuela 
has spread to its closest ally Cuba, leading to a contraction in the supply 
of Venezuelan oil to Havana and to lower export revenues for the island. 
Against this backdrop of weakening economic linkages with 
Venezuela, Cuba’s changing relationship with the United States becomes 
all the more important. The most comprehensive in decades, President 
Obama’s liberalizing changes to sanctions rules with respect to Cuba 
boosted the flow of U.S. travelers (and remittances) to the island and 
paved the way for the resumption of U.S. commercial flights and cruise 
services to Cuba. They have also stimulated a great deal of interest in the 
Cuban market among U.S. and foreign firms and enabled several 
American companies to sign business deals with the Cuban government, 
most notably in the tourism and telecommunications sectors. Some of 
these trends continue despite President Trump’s efforts to chip away at 
Obama’s legacy with stricter rules on travel and business with Cuba; and 
if the embargo is out of the picture, closer economic ties with the United 
States could provide important new economic opportunities for Cuba 
precisely at a time when it needs them most. 
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